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NOTES
Conclusion
The success or failure of a townhouse depends largely upon the
drafting skill of the attorney who is advising the developer. Unlike
condominiums, there is no single statute to examine for assistance in
establishing a townhouse. The attorney must utilize a broad background
in property law, for the townhouse cuts across many different legal
problems. As in other types of drafting, the attorney must have one eye
to the future and prepare his instruments in such a manner that they
not only will survive possible future litigation but also will eliminate the
necessity of any litigation.

PREVENTION OF SUBDIVISION CONTROL EVASION
IN INDIANA
Since 1950 there has been an "explosion" in metropolitan population.' The greatest growth has been in the area which rings our metropolitan areas.2 The advance of the suburbs has changed the face of the
countryside; shopping centers and residential subdivisions are strewn
across the once empty land.3 This growth has given new impetus to
municipal planning and subdivision control. As the amount of subdividing by private promoters increases, the importance of controlling
subdividing is emphasized by the frequently tangled street patterns, uneconomic mixing of inconsistent uses, crazy quilts of lot sizes, and poor
planning in general.4
Awareness of these problems is indicated by the amount of recent
legislation' and writing on the subject of subdivision regulation.' The
1. The 1960 census returns dramatize the "explosive" population increases that are

occurring in metropolitan areas and reveal that over 80% of the nation's total population

increase during the last decennial period took place in these areas. Schmandt, Municipal

Control of Urban Expansion,29 FORDHAM L. REv. 637 (1961).
2. See Comment, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 310.
3. Ibid.
4. HoRACK AND NOLAN, LAND USE CoNTRoLs 202 (1955)

(the crazy quilt of lot
sizes): Frey, Subdivision Control and Planning, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 411 (poor planning
in general).
5. "Every state in the country has enacted enabling legislation allowing communities to undertake planning subdivision controls." Over three-fourths of the cities with
more than 10,000 people have adopted local subdivision ordinances. Id. at 418.
6. Cunningham, Control of Land Use in New Jersey under the 1953 Planning
Statutes, 15 RuToams L. Rxv. (1960); Frey, supra note 4; Melli, Subdivision Control

in iWisconsin, 1953 Wis. L. REv. 389; Note 48 Ky. L.J. 252 (1960) ; Note, 36 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1205 (1961).
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growth of subdivision control has been rapid, but unfortunately many
problems exist, partly as a result of the lack of judicial guidance for the
planning commissions.'
In directing the growth of a city the best and perhaps the only
opportunity for proper imposition of details of planning is at the original
subdivision of the raw land.' In order that the development of the
community be orderly and planned, the planning body must be able to
intervene at this critical stage of subdivision development.' Among
conditions required by planning bodies and upheld are the dedication of
land for streets, the grading and paving of these streets, the construction
of sewers, curbs, gutters, and other drainage facilities, the dedication of
land for parks and playgrounds, and the installation of water mains."0
If the subdivider does not comply with these requirements then the
burden will fall on the municipality to do so.
As municipal budgets mount," planning commissions seek to impose
the responsibility for improvements on the subdivider. Consequently,
most site improvements presently are made at the subdivider's expense."
In addition to these increasing requirements, the subdividers are faced
with other problems created by subdivision control. For example, subdividers often complain of being delayed by infrequent meetings of the
planning boards. These meetings are usually monthly, and the builder
must appear at them, present his subdivision plans, and gain board approval before he can move one shovelful of dirt." The subdivider's
major complaint regarding subdivision control procedure is the increase
in real estate tax assessment which often accompanies subdivision ap7. Frey, supra note 4, at 434.
8. See Note, 48 Ky. L.J. 252 (1960).
9. The planning body's authority to do so generally has been upheld. See annot.,
11 A.L.R.2d 524, 532 (1950).
10. See, e.g., Yardville Estates, Inc. v. City of Trenton, 66 N.J. Super. 51, 16S
A.2d 429 (1961) (construction of water mains) ; Zastrow v. Village of Brown Deer, 9
Wisc. 2d 100, 100 N.W.2d 359 (1960) (construction of water mains) ; Green Acres Bldg.
Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 22 Misc. 2d 877, 197 N.Y.S.2d 565 (Sup. Ct. 1959)
(construction of sewers); Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 2,33, 137 N.E.2d
371 (1956) (construction of curbs) ; Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P2d 1
(1949) (dedication of land for streets); In the Matter of Lake Secor Dev. Co., 141
Misc. 913, 252 N.Y.S. 809 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (dedication of land for playgrounds) ; Allen
v. Stockwell, 210 Mich. 488, 178 N.W. 27 (1920) (construction of streets).
11. Each new house in a subdivision requires . . . capital outlays of $2,500 to
$3,500 or more . . . only a portion of which is recouped through normal subdivision
regulations. . . . evidencing a growing sentiment that new residents should somehow

be charged with a greater share of the capital burden . . .some municipalities have
sought to increase their building permit fees. . . ." Schmandt, supra.note 1, at 646.
12. This was not so thirty years ago, when the community was almost solely responsible. Frey, supra note 4, at 434.
13. Tilden, Improved Administration of Subdivision Control, 46 MASs. L.Q. 201
(1961). The author discusses problems and complaints created by planning commission
administration from his experience as a member of a planning board.

NOTES
proval.' 4 Usually the land to be subdivided has been assessed as farm
land; but the plans which are submitted to the planning board show a
proposed residential or industrial site, and when approval is gained and
the subdivider records there may be an increase in the tax assessment.
Improvements are generally demonstrably beneficial to the purchaser
and therefore the cost for them can be passed on to the purchaser in the
form of higher prices without much objection. But taxes may not seem
to be beneficial to the purchaser, and they cannot be passed on easily. The
problem the increase in taxes poses to subdividers might be such that
the subdivider will not plat his land but instead will sell his lots by metes
and bounds. By avoiding the higher assessments the subdivider at the
same time may avoid altogether the control of the planning body which
indirectly controls the subdivision through use of plat approval as a
condition precedent to recordation. In such a case, unless the planning
body either can make use of other devices to control indirectly all subdivision or has some authority to control directly all subdivision-that
is, impose its conditions directly upon subdividers without using plat
devices-then the subdivision control legislation of the particular state
and municipality is meaningless.
This note will focus upon one method of evasion of subdivision control used by subdividers in Indiana: the transfer of unplatted, subdivided
land by metes an bounds without approval of the planning body. It will
investigate how this evasion is accomplished and what authority the
planning bodies have under present statutes to prevent such transfers by
direct and indirect controls.
I.

SUBDIVISION CONTROL IN

GENERAL

The whole field of subdivision regulation normally is peculiarly
a creature of legislation," and the power to impose legislative controls
and regulate the subdivision of land has generally been upheld by the
courts.'
Subdivision control legislation is aimed at governing the
physical development of the community and its environs in relation to its
social and economic well-being and provides the legal framework within
which the community may carry out this objective."
To have effective subdivision control legislation, the legislative body
must take into account three interests which are affected by subdivision
control. The first interest to be considered is that of the community,
14. Melli, supra note 6, at 439.
15. Pennyton Homes, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of the Borough of Stanhope, 197

A.2d 870, 41 N.J. 578 (1964).
16. See annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 524 (1950).

17. Angermeier v. Borough of Sea Girt, 27 N.J. 298, 308, 142 A.2d 624, 629 (1958);
36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1205 (1961). See also Note, 48 Ky. L.J. 252 (1960).
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whose interest is primarily responsible for the "prompting" of subdivision
control legislation. The layout and character of the community may be
determined for an indefinite period by the subdivision of its environs. 8
Slums, cramped school areas, and traffic congestion are traceable to the
original layout of the community and often to uncontrolled subdividing. 9
As the amount of subdividing increases the municipal budgets are strained
by the need to provide new schools, police and fire stations, larger sewer
treatment systems, and other local government facilities.2" The community therefore wishes to obtain a maximum tax yield from the new
subdivision, but should the subdivision be improper the area might become a "blighted" one from which tax returns would be low.2 Should
only a few people build homes in the improper subdivision and then
petition the municipality for public services the cost of the services might
be assessed on all the lots; and the vacant lot owner might find the tax
burden more than he wishes to pay and become tax delinquent." Also, in
the case where the subdivider has no interest in the land because he has
a financial arrangement with the owner, after selling enough lots to make
a quick profit'he might move on to another promotion and leave the
owner the burden of the vacant lots, which are now assessed as building
lots.23 In such a situation the owner frequently loses his holdings in a
subdivision tax sale.24 The burden of the tax delinquency falls upon the
city, county, or state taxpayers depending on the working of the law in
the particular locality.25 This factor and the "spotty" development
which is common in the case of improper subdivisions combine to make
restoration of the unused subdivided lands into a productive economic
unit nearly impossible.
The second interest to be considered is that of protection of investment. The buyer and the lender are mutually interested in protecting their
investment; control of subdividing can furnish this protection by preserving property values.2" This interest is illustrated by the interest
18. Melli, supra note 6, at 392.
19. HORACK AND NOLAN, op. Cit. supra note 4, at 202.
20. Schmandt, supra note 1, at 637.
21. See Melli, supra note 6, at 392 (blighted area); Comment, 1961 Wis. L. REv.
310 (1961) (maximum yield).
22. HORACK AND NOLAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 204.
23. Ibid.
24. Aschnan, Chronically Tax Delinquent Land in Cook County, 25 LAND EcoNozIcs 204 (1946) (250,000 parcels of tax delinquent land in Chicago in 1946).

25.

CORMICK, PREMATURE SUBDIVISION OF URBAN LANDS

290 (1938).

26. "By requiring that the original layout 'be of a type that will maintain its
character for a long period of years the community is protecting his [the purchaser's]
investment." Melli, supra note 6, at 396.

NOTES
shown by the FHA in the original layout of the subdivision." Furthermore, the buyer does not want to be subject to penalties imposed by the
municipality for a violation by the subdivider of subdivision control
legislation.2" This does happen, and the buyer may find his land useless
without utilities or find himself subject to fines.29
The third interest to be considered is that of the subdivider. The
subdivider is a business man who wishes to realize as much profit as he
can from the sale of subdivided land in the shortest time possible.2 " This
does not mean that the average builder is unaware of his responsibility
to the community.3 ' Actually most subdividers are interested in good
standards because they help them gain better financing and aid them
in selling.32 Good subdivision control protects the subdivider from
overdevelopment and from subdivision of areas which are not suitable for development. Inappropriate subdividing frequently brings
financial ruin to the subdivider. 3 Planning bodies can prevent this by
developing thoughtful municipal growth policies and implementing them
through subdivision regulations. The subdivider wants to be protected
from having his development surrounded by undesirable developments.
Planning bodies, by supervising all subdivision activity, can protect the
subdivider from this by imposing good standards on all subdividers and
by co-ordinating the planning of all connected development.2 4 The subdivider also has a special interest in the timing of required compliance
with subdivision regulations. Poor subdivision control which requires
the subdivider to complete all improvements and comply with all require27. The percentage of subdividers who seek approval has never been established,
but one writer states "the vast majority do." MCMICHAEL, REAL ESTATE SUBDIVISIONS

140 (1949).
28. For general discussions of enforcement of subdivision legislation, see Reps,
Control of Land Subdivision by Municipal Planning Boards, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 258, 278-80
(1955) ; Note, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1205, 1212-15 (1961).
29. See Note, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1226, 1236-37 (1952), for a discussion of subjection
of purchasers to enforcement procedures of the municipality. The courts have generally
protected the buyer where the sale is held illegal. See, e.g., Thomas v. Corwin, 147
Ala. 478, 39 So. 898 (1906) ; Scott v. Apgar, 238 La. 29, 113 So. 2d 457 (1959). It has
been recognized that protection of the buyer is a legitimate use of the police power.
In re Sidebothem, 12 Cal. 2d 434, 436, 85 P.2d 453, 454 (1939). Buyers also have been
protected by statute. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 40:55-1.23 (Supp. 1960) ; R.I. LAws
ANN. § 45-23-13 (1956).
30. Frey, supra note 4, at 411.
31. For a discussion of 'builder's awareness of his responsibilities and an article in
his defense see Feinberg, Subdivision Regulation Pitfalls and Aids for the Real Estate
Developer, A.B.A. SEcT. R.P. 13 (1962).
32. Frey, supra note 4, at 426.
33. NAT'L Assoc. OF HOM1E BUILDERS OF THE U.S., HOME BUILDERS MANUAL FOR
LAND DEVELOPMENT (1950).
34. Even where each subdivider is attempting to do a good job in his own subdivision, their uncoordinated planning may have undesirable results. AscHER, URBAN REDEVELOPMENT: PROBLEMS AND PRACTICES 240 (Woodbury ed. 1953).
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ments before the planning body approves the subdivision plan would
necessitate expenditure of sums by him prior to the sale of the lots."
This could deter the laying out and developing of needed subdivisions
until the subdivider is certain that home buyers await completion of the
project. Well formulated subdivision control can avoid this. For example, many states allow the subdivider to submit a bond which guarantees payment for improvements, allowing early approval of his plan; and
consequently, the subdivider can sell his lots and homes before improvements are made."8

II.

THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY OF INDIANA MUNICIPALITIES
TO CONTROL SUBDIVISIONS

A.

The scope of statutory authority to apply indirect controls.
One of the two principal sources from which Indiana municipalities
get authority to control subdividing is the specific power which is granted
by statute. The 1947 enabling act establishes the city, town, and county
planning commissions "to promote the orderly development of its governmental units and its environs . . ." and declares the objective of the act

to be the improvement of "the present health, safety, convenience and
welfare of their citizens." 7 After its creation, the planning commission
has the duty to adopt a master plan ".

.

. for the development of the

city and such contiguous unincorporated area outside the corporate
limits of the city as . . . bears reasonable relation to the development of
the city . . . within two miles from the corporate limits of the
city. . . . "" Should the county have a planning commission established

under this act, the city planning commission within the county exercises
territorial jurisdiction only over the area within the city's corporate limits
unless the ordinance of the board of county commissioners authorizes the
municipal planning commission to continue or to establish jurisdiction
over the contiguous unincorporated area within two miles of the corporate
limits. 9 After the adoption of the master plan the planning commission
has the duty to recommend an ordinance containing provisions for subdivision control and the approval of plats and replats" to the city council
or board of county commissioners, whichever is the appropriate body."
35. Compliance with most minimal requirements-grading, water mains, sanitary
sewers-often comprises as much as 20% of the total home cost. MCMIcHAEL, REAL
ESTATE SUBDIVISION 135 (1949).

36. This is the case in Indiana. See IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-751 (Burns 1964).
also Note, 28 IND. L.J. 544, 574 (1953), for a listing of every state.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

IND. ANN. STAT. §
IND. ANN. STAT. §
Ibid.
IND. ANN. STAT. §
IND. ANN. STAT. §

53-701 (Burns 1964).
53-734 (Burns 1964).
53-745 (Burns 1964).
53-738 (Burns 1964).

See

NOTES
The oldest and most effective method by which plan commissions
have applied requirements to effect the purposes of subdivision control
is through the plat.42 The plat device was introduced originally to facilitate land conveyancing43 by permitting lots to be identified simply
by reference to their numbers on the plat, which is a map of a tract of
land with lots, streets, alleys, and other details drawn to scale." Recorded
plats benefit the municipality as well as the property vendor because they
facilitate tax assessment and create more accurate records of land transfers.4" In addition, most subdivision controls are enforced only indirectly
by asking compliance with them as a condition precedent to recording
the subdivision plat." However, control of subdividing through this
indirect method is rendered ineffective when the subdivider avoids plat
recording and municipal control by transferring his land by metes and
bounds sales.4" In this type of transfer the subdivider does not plat his
subdivided land but sells each lot separately according to its individual
description in terms of metes and bounds. Thus he not only avoids the
indirect control of the planning body but also deprives the municipality of
the other advantages which accrue to it as a result of platting.
It is arguable that the means to prevent metes and bounds transfers
to evade subdivision control are available in the presently existing
statutory authority of the plan commission. Section 48-801' states that
anyone who lays off ".

.

. subdivisions of any lots within the limits of

any city or town, shall, previous to the sale of any lots in such .
subdivision . . . cause to be recorded in the recorder's office . . . a
correct plat of such . . . subdivision." Although this section has never

been so interpreted or enforced, it could be taken to require that before
lots of a subdivision are sold the land must be platted and recorded.
Sections 53-701," 53-732,"o and 53-703,"' which grant broad authority
42. Ibid.; Note, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1226, 1232 (1952) ; Note, 48 Ky. L.J. 252 (1960).
Courts first upheld subdivision control on the theory that legislation could impose any
requirement on the privilege of recording the plat. As recording of real property became
essential to its disposition, this reasoning was found inadequate. Recording became a
"right," and the courts changed to a rationale that the statute was a proper exercise of
the police power.
43. "The property owner who proposed to convey sections of a tract in the form
of lots was required first to survey the area and make a plat designating streets, easements, and the boundaries of the lots. The map was then recorded, and the lots were
conveyed by number, instead of metes and bounds." Note, 29 IND. L.J. 408, 409 (1954).
44. BLAcM, LAW DICrOiARY 1309 (4th ed.).
45. See Melli, supra note 6, at 411 (accurate records) ; Note, IND. L.J. 408 (1955)
(tax assessment).

46. Reps, supra note 28, at 278.

47. Melli, supra note 6, at 412.
48. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-801 (Burns 1964).
49. IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-701 (Burns 1964).
50. IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-732 (Burns 1964).
51. IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-703 (Burns 1964).
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to the planning commissions to promote dei eopment of the governmental
unit and to formulate the policies to be implemented by ordinances, would
support the conclusion that the planning commissions have the power
under 48-801 to require that all subdivisions of land within their jurisdiction be platted. Since the authority of the commission to enforce subdivision controls indirectly by making them conditions precedent to
commission approval of plats for recording is not disputed, if 48-801 is
construed to require that all plats of all subdivisions be recorded, the
commission's present authority would be adequate to reach all subdivisions.
Even if the all-inclusive 48-801 argument should fail, existing
statutes arguably give the commission power to control some metes and
bounds subdivisions. In Indiana, as in other states52 where the enabling
acts have been construed to allow indirect control of subdividing through
plat approval as a condition precedent to recording, subdividers not only
have been avoiding such control by metes and bounds transfers but also
have often been displaying a plat for the purpose of metes and bounds
sales negotiations. Some states have statutes53 which forbid this practice,
thus allowing the planning commission greater control of subdivisions.
The question here arises: does the Indiana act empower the planning
commission to prevent the practice and gain more control over platted
subdivisions which are later sold by metes and bounds? Although never
so construed or enforced, section 49-3242,"' which provides that "whenever a plat is made of any subdivision . . . outside the corporate limits
of any city . . . such plat shall be submitted to the board of county
commissioners . . . for approval," and section 49-3241," = which provides
that ". . . any person who may lay out a subdivision of any lots or
lands situated outside the corporate limits of any city . . .shall prior to

the sale of any lots in such subdivision cause to be recorded in the office
of the county recorder . . . a correct plat of such subdivision . . .,"

could be interpreted and enforced as requiring approval and recordation
of any plat made for any reason within the county plan commission's
territorial jurisdiction. The complementary sections for land within city
jurisdictions are section 48-801, which provides ". . . any person who
may lay off . . . any subdivision of any lots or lands within the limits
52. See Melli, supra note 6, at 412-15, for a discussion of subdivision control avoidance by metes and bounds sales.
53. Penalties have been imposed for sale of land when reference during the sales
negotiations has been made to an unrecorded plat, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 37, § 800
(1959). Many statutes expressly provide sales by metes and bounds will not exempt
the transaction, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 22772 (1961).
54. IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-3242 (Bums 1964).

55.

IND. ANN. STAT.

§ 49-3241 (Burns 1964).
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to any city . . . shall, previous to the sale of any lots . . . cause to be
recorded in the record's office of the proper county a correct p/at . . .
and 48-802 6 which provides "whenever a plat is made of any lots or
land . . . as a subdivision of any lots or lands within such city . . . such
plat shall be submitted for approval . . . before the same is offered for
record in the recorder's office." Because of their imperative language,
these sections could be construed to require subdividers within the city
plan commission's jurisdiction to plat their subdivisions, submit them for
approval, and cause them to be recorded in the proper county. Section
48-801 and 48-802 lend themselves to a stronger interpretation for the
city jurisdiction than do 49-3242 and 49-3241 for the county jurisdiction
by seemingly requiring that all subdivisions within corporate limits be
platted.
B.

The scope of statutory authority for applying direct subdivision
controls

Indirect controls are limited by definition to the extent of the commission's authority to require that subdivisions be platted and the plats
be recorded since it may enforce indirect controls only by withholding
plat approval. The commission's authority to require platting under
48-801 may be all-inclusive, but that argument has not been tested. Meanwhile, the continuing evasion of indirect controls suggests that one solution would be direct controls which are not dependent on recording but
which might be imposed on subdivisions without reference to whether
the subdivision is platted or submitted for approval to the planning commission. The authority of the planning commission to impose such
controls under present legislation is not clear.
The planning commission is created by section 53-701 to promote
the development of the governmental unit. This section seems to place
no restrictions on the commission's authority in acting to improve the
present health, safety, convenience, and welfare of the local unit's
citizens and in planning for the unit's future development." A special
concern to the legislators was that "...
residential areas provide healthy
surroundings for family life . .",S which indicates particular interest
in the control of residential development. Moreover, that the 1947 enabling act's" intention is one of expansion of the powers of planning
boards is indicated by 53-701 : ". . . that certain regulatory powers be
created over developments affecting public welfare and not otherwise
56. Iw. AxN.
57. Ibid.

STAT.

§ 48-802

(Burns 1963).

STAT.

§§ 53-701 to -795 (Burns 1964).

58. Ibid.

59. IxD. ANx.
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controlled. . .

Section 53-701 authorizes the planning commission

."

to prepare a master plan and formulate policies for the development of
public ways and structures, the issuance of improvement location permits
on platted and unplatted land, and the laying out of public ways and
services. Section 53-732 allows the commission to formulate these three
policies but sets no limit upon what policies may be formulated in preparation of the master plan other than those which ".

.

. assure the pro-

motion of public health, safety, morals, convenience, order, or general
welfare for the sake of efficiency and economy in the process of development." This language is very broad and would allow the commission to
incorporate into the master plan any subdivision control policies which
appear necessary. Section 53-703 defines master plan to include ".
ordinances as may be deemed necessary to implement such complete
master plan .

.

.

and provision for such regulations as are deemed

necessary to their enforcement." The only express indication that this
ordinance and master plan contain provision for subdivision control
appears in section 53-745 which states that

"

. . after a master plan

and an ordinance, containing provisionis for subdivision control and the
approval of plats and replats, have been adopted . . . a plat of a sub-

division shall not be filed with the auditor, and the recorder shall not
record it unless it has first been approved by the plan commission ..
This section is critical as to whether the broad powers conferred upon
the planning commission in sections 53-701, 53-732, and 53-703 to
control the development of its governmental unit is limited in the area
of subdivision control to only those subdivisions which are platted.
Section 53-745 contains the following language: ".

.

. containing pro-

visions for subdivision control and the approval of plats and replats."
Does this phrase modify both "master plan" and "ordinance"? If it
modifies only "ordinance" then it would seem a "master plan" could not
be limited to containing provisions for subdivision control which are
tied to plats. Assuming this phrase does modify both "master plan" and
"ordinance," an even more critical ambiguity appears. The phrase,
". . .containing provisions for subdivision control and the approval of
plats and replats . . ." consists of two elements: first, "provisions for
subdivision control" and, second, provisions for ". . . the approval of

plats and replats." Is the relationship of these two concepts such that
provisions in the master plan and ordinance relative to "subdivision
control" may exist independent from the provisions for "approval of plats
and replats"? The fact that section 53-745 states that a ".

.

. plat of a

subdivision shall not be filed with the auditor and the recorder shall not
record it unless "approved" adds no weight to the argument that "subdivision control" is tied to "approval of plats" since this clause may be

NOTES

said to be unrelated to provisions for "subdivision control" to be set forth
in the master plan and ordinance and, instead, definitive of the provisions
for "approval of plats" which are to appear therein. In aid to the
argument that "subdivision control" is more comprehensive than "approval of plats" (although approval of plats of subdivisions is one
method by which subdividing can be controlled) is the broad language
of sections 53-701, 53-732, and 53-703, which shows the legislative intent
to be one of expansion of planning commission power over municipal
development. This appears to be a rather circular argument, but it is not
without force, for if "subdivision control" is restricted to only the "approval of plats," the objective of this legislation-"to plan for future
development"-can be reduced to a nullity in the area of subdivision
development by subdividers who sell their lots by metes and bounds.
Further support for the argument that planning bodies are empowered by 53-745 to control directly the subdivision of land is found
in the 1963 amendment to 53-745,"o which added a second paragraph,
it**'any subdivision of land for purposes other than agricultural use
shall be reviewed by the planning commission having jurisdiction over
the area involved and the determination shall be made that such division
shall be in accordance with the master plan." This section could be construed to have expanded the authority of the planning commission or to
have defined its power to be coextensive with the thrust of sections
53-701, 53-732, and 53-703. Thus, under either construction the planning
commission is enabled to control unplatted subdivisions directly. In
support of this construction, it might be asked why, if the legislature
did not intend to expand the authority of the commission, it used the
term "subdivision of land" and "such division" in the amendment rather
than repeating the prior statutory language, "plats and replats"? As a
matter of statutory interpretation, when a legislative body amends a
section and uses different terms, not repeating the prior language, a presumption arises that the legislative intent was to enact something
different." Here, the words "subdivision of land" and "such division"
were used. The crux of this construction problem hinges upon what the
legislature meant by using these terms. Subdivision generally is defined
as a "division into smaller parts of the same thing or subject-matter. '6 2
Also, the words "such division" are seen to be synonomous with "subdivision of land" and add weight to the argument that 53-745 is aimed at the
division of land rather than platting. This definition of "subdivision"
60.

Ind. Acts 1963, ch. 385, § 4.

61.
62.

MCCAFFERY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 155
BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).

(1953).
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is the basis of the definition in all states where the enabling acts define
the term." There seems to be no general agreement of how many parts
a tract of land must be divided into to constitute a "subdivision" for
purposes of the particular statute, but such a determination is a question
of how much jurisdiction the plan commission should have. "4 The Indiana enabling acte5 does not define the term "subdivision"; impliedly
this is left for the planning body to formulate, allowing them to limit
or broaden their jurisdictional powers. In any event, as a matter of
definition the term "subdivision of land" cannot be said to be restricted
to merely platted subdivisions.
However, planning bodies have interpreted the "plats and replats"
language of the first paragraph of section 53-745 as limiting their power
to control subdivisions to the indirect method. This argument limiting
the commission's power also is supported by 53-750," which speaks of
a "master plan and ordinance containing provisions for the approval of
plats and replats," and 53-752,6" which gives exclusive control over the
approval of plats within defined jurisdictional limits to the commission.
Construing these three sections together gives rise to a negative implication " that the commission has authority only over platted subdivisions of
land and thus lacks authority to control directly those not platted.
Adding weight to this negative implication, the Attorney General
has construed the 1963 amendment to 53-745 as not increasing the
authority of the planning commission but rather as limiting its jurisdiction by excluding land which has been subdivided for agricultural uses. "
The legislature's failure to amend 53-745, 53-750, and 53-752 by
eliminating from all three sections the term "plats" and substituting the
term "subdivision" might be further indication of the absence of a
legislative intention to extend the commission's power to unplatted subdivisions. By leaving those sections functional in terms of "plats and
replats" it seems that the legislature may not have intended to expand
the authority of the commission by the 1963 amendment.7" Whether this
63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 109, § 1 (1961) (two lots); ORE. REV. STAT. § 92.010
(1957) (two, three, and four lots) ; Wis. STAT. § 236.02 (1962) (five lots).
64. It has been held that defining "subdivision" as a division into tivo parts is an
unreasonable extension of the police power. Kass v. Levin, 104 So. 2d 572, 578 (Fla.
1958).
65. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 53-701 to -795 (Burns 1964).
66. IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-750 (Burns 1964).
67. IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-752 (Burns 1964).
68. The general rule of statutory construction is "expressio unis est exclusio
alterius." That is, specific mention of one thing implies exclusion of other things.
McCAYFERY, op. cit. mtpra note 99, at 50.

69. IND. Anr'Y GEN. Ops. 255 (1963).
70. "To determine the color of a word or phrase in a statute, it is essential to
examine the context in which it is set. One must study every word of the contemplated
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and the Attorney General's opinion rebut the presumption that the 1963
amendment to 53-745 expanded or defined the authority of the planning
commission to include control of unplatted subdivisions remains at least
arguable, however.
Of course, the Attorney General's opinion is rendered moot if the
argument that prior to the 1963 amendment the planning commission had
power to control unplatted subdivisions is sound. If the commission had
the power to control unplatted subdivisions prior to the 1963 amendment,
then the question of whether or not the 1963 amendment to 53-745 expanded the power of the commission over unplatted subdivisions is
irrelevant.
If the validity of direct controls is established and a commission does
impose them, it will have to make provision for their enforcement since
the withholding of plat approval obviously will not serve as a means of
enforcing direct controls. One method which might be used to enforce
not only direct controls but also platting and recording requirements in
connection with indirect controls is the denial of improvement location
permits for proposed structures on lots which have access only from
unapproved streets until such structure is approved by the commission.
While planning bodies have assumed the legality of this, the courts are
divided. Ordinances enacted authorizing planning commissions to condition the issuance of permits on approval of proposed structures have
been attacked as vesting "arbitrary power in a public official which may
be used in the interests of some to the exclusion of others" and as therefore unreasonable and void."' Similar ordinances have been upheld as
being both constitutional and a lawful delegation of legislative power to
the planning body."2 By virtue of 53-732 the planning commission is
given the authority to formulate the policies for the issuance of improvement location permits for platted and unplatted lands and for the
development and laying out of public and private ways, all of which shall
be contained in the master plan, and 53-703 establishes the commission's
authority to enact ordinances pursuant to the master plan to enforce it.
bill in its relation to the other language accompanying it." McCAFFERY, op. cit. sUpra
note 63, at 27.
71. See People ex. rel. Schimpff v. Norvell, 368 I1. 325, 13 N.E.2d 960 (1938),
holding that any ordinance vesting in a public official arbitrary power which might be
used in the interests of some and to the exclusion of others is unreasonable and void.
72. See Mitchell v. Morris, 94 Cal. App. 2d 446, 210 P.2d 857 (1949) (court upheld
ordinance, saying that there was no unlawful delegation of legislative power and that
the exercise of the discretionary powers of the planning body to grant permits is an
exercise of quasi-judicial power and not an exercise of legislative power). Some states
have provided by statute that the issuance of building permits may be prohibited or
regulated where a lot abuts an unaccepted street. See, e.g., CONN. Rxv. STAT. §§ 8-27

(1958),

KAN.

RLv.

STAT. § 13-1112

(1957).
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This means that the planning commission can enact an ordinance granting
itself the power to approve proposed structures and to grant or deny
permits to applicants accordingly. This proposed use of improvement
location permits also suggests that the planning commission might use
them to enforce the suggested constructions of the statute which
require the subdivider to plat. For example, 48-801 provided" . . . any
person who may lay off . . . any subdivision . . . shall . . . cause to
be recorded . . . a correct plat."

The commission also is given the authority to formulate policies
for the laying out and development of public services"' such as sewers,
water, gas. Like the improvement location permit, public services can be
utilized as an enforcement "tool" which may be withheld until requirements are met and might be used by the planning commission to enforce
48-801 by requiring the subdivider to plat. Although such use of these
services has not been the subject of litigation in Indiana, for the sake of
furthering the policies and objectives set forth in enabling act74 and
master plan adopted pursuant to it, the commission might be justified
in using them as a means for enforcing controls.
However, withholding building permits or public services as methods
of enforcing and imposing requirements on subdividers presents two
serious practical problems. First, it would place a heavy burden on the
official who is to issue permits or extend utilities to determine to which
applicant these policies apply. The fact that the particular lot is located
upon unapproved subdivided land will not be evidenced by the application
for permit or public services. Second, if requirements are enforced in
this manner they may penalize the purchaser rather than the subdivider.
Zoning, of course, to a certain extent affects subdivisions whether
or not they are platted." Where the municipality is menaced by excessive
73. IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-732 (Burns 1964).
74. IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-701 to -795 (Burns 1964).
75. The courts have handled subdivision control cases in much the same manner
as they have zoning cases. Since the Supreme Court has not dealt directly with subdivision control, the courts rely on the classic zoning case of Village of Euclid v.
Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Court held that a zoning ordinance was valid unless
it was "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals and general welfare," id. at 395; and this standard also applies
to municipal attempts to control subdivisions under the police power. Zoning and subdivision legislation are somewhat related in that they both attempt to control the development of the municipality by limiting what the owner may do with his land. See Note,
65 HARv. L. Rav. 1226, 1227 (1952). Zoning relates to the type of building development
and subdivision control relates to the way land is divided and made ready for development. The two are mutually dependent because the character of the use to be made of
the land cannot be separated from the layout of the area. See Melli, supra note 6, at
389. Zoning and subdivision control differ as preventive measures in that zoning requirements are generally negative prohibitions on uses while subdivision control requirements are usually positive exactions from the owner. See Reps & Smith, Control of

Urban Land Subdivision, 14 SYRAcusE L. Rxv. 405, 407 (1963).
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subdividing, the commission can eliminate this problem by zoning the
district for a use less intensive than residential, such as agricultural, or by
zoning it as a flood plain and thus eliminating all building activity.
III.

THE IMPLIED AUTHORITY OF MUNICIPALITIES TO
CONTROL SUBDIVISION

Should express authority for direct subdivision controls be found
wanting in existing planning and zoning legislation, municipalities may
be able to base direct subdivision controls on a second source of authority:
implied police power. Police power may be implied from specific grants
of authority to town trustees and city councils,7 or it may be implied
from the creation of the municipal corporation. The Indiana Supreme
Court has declared:
The police power primarily inheres in the state; but the
legislature may and in common practice does delegate a large
measure of it to the municipal corporations. The power may be
conferred in express terms, or it may be inferred from the mere
fact of the creation of the corporation. The so-called inferred
or inherent policy powers of such corporations are as much
delegated powers as those conferred in express terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation
of the corporation, and the additional fact that the corporation
can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such power ...
Among the implied powers passed to the municipal corporation
is the power to enact and enforce reasonable by-laws and
ordinances for the protection of health, life and property."7
In view of the importance of subdivision control to the future wellbeing of communities, it is not unreasonable to contend that authority
to exercise such control falls within this definition of the implied police
power of municipalities and that municipalities may lawfully delegate
such authority to their planning commissions. Although precedent on the
use of the implied power to control land use is scant, an ordinance specifying the minimum size of tourist camp sleeping rooms and limiting the
length of time a person could remain a resident of such camps was upheld
8
as a proper exercise of the police power in Spitler v. Town of Munster."
The court affirmed the implied power of the town to require a citizen to
76. See IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-301 (towns), -1407 (cities) (1963) for the powers
specifically granted to municipalities.
77. City of Crawfordsville v. Braden, 130 Ind. 149, 154-55, 28 N.E. 849, 851 (1891).

78. 214 Ind. 75, 14 N.E.2d 579 (1938).
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use his property so as not to defeat reasonable regulations established
by the municipality for the protection of the lives, health, and property
of its residents. Reasonable regulation of the subdivision of land would
certainly be no more restrictive than the regulation upheld in Spitler,
and a substantial case can be made for the proposition that subdivision
control is quite as necessary and appropriate to the long-range protection
of health and property as the ordinance in that case.
However, the very existence of the present statutory scheme for local
planning commissions may pose a bar to the establishment of the implied
police power to control subdivision. The 1947 enabling act"9 may circumscribe the scope of municipal activity in this matter and deny to the
municipality any authority to control subdivision other than that delegated
to it by the statute. But this preemption argument can be met; in fact,
the argument is somewhat self-defeating. If the enabling act8 gives the
planning commission power to control subdivision directly, the preemption question is rendered moot. The implied police power rationale
need be invoked only if it is decided that the enabling act 8' confers only
the authority to control subdivision indirectly through control of the
recording of plats. It may then be contended that although the act82 may
completely cover the area of indirect controls, it does not deal at all with
direct controls and consequently does not limit the local unit's authority,
based on its implied police power, to use this most effective method.
In addition to statutory powers and implied powers, Indiana municipalities are endowed with some authority under a sort of residuum of
power theory. A line of cases has held that since the people had authority
to govern their own local affairs prior to the existence of the state, the
state has only that authority over local affairs which is specifically given
it by the constitution.8 3 Consequently, the municipalities have power to
regulate purely local matters. In invoking this principle, the essential fact
to be established is that the activity to be regulated is strictly a local
matter. It could be argued that subdivision control is a purely local matter
and that the state legislature has recognized that it is a purely local
matter by not attempting either to specify what controls should be
imposed on subdivisions or to require commissions to control subdivisions at all.
79. InD. ANN. STAT. § 53-701 to -795 (Burns 1964).
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. See State ex rel. Jameson v. Denny, 118 Ind. 382, 21 N.E. 252 (1888) ; City of
Evansville v. State ex reL. Blend, 118 Ind. 426, 21 N.E. 267 (1888) ; State ex reL. Holt
v. Denny, 118 Ind. 449, 21 N.E. 274 (1888). See generally, Conrad, Indiana Municipalities and the State Government, 4 IND. UJ. 231 (1929).
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IV.

OTHER SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF SUBDIVISION
CONTROL EvAsION

If planning commissions presently do not have the authority, either
express or implied, to control and prevent metes and bounds subdivisions,
then authority could, of course, be provided by amendment of the present
enabling act. For "strong-arm" prevention of metes and bounds sales it
might be desirable to amend by revising the

1935 subdivision control

statute, which stated:
. . . no plat of a subdivision of land . . . or part shall be filed
or recorded until . . . approved by such commission...

[N]o conveyance of any parcel of ground less than 2 acres
. . . shall be filed or recorded until the written approval of such
commission . . . unless . . . parcel . . . comprises . . . one
."
entire lot . . . within a subdivision already approved...

This section was repealed by the 1947 enabling act.8" One writer 6
states that it was repealed because of the feeling that such metes and
bounds sales of subdivided property could not be so prohibited. However,
it appears that there was no real question as to this statute's legality; its
repeal may more realistically be credited to the lobbying of pressure
groups, such as real estate promoters and developers who desired looser
control upon their development activities. As long as there is no question
of the section's legality, some variation of this section would be helpful
in eliminating all such sales. For example, the basic subdivision control
section, 53-745, could be amended to require approval of all lots in a subdivision prior to their sale.
To strengthen both this possible amendment and the present statute,
the statute also might be amended to define "subdivision" as a division
of a parcel of land into a specified number of lots. This would allow
application of the term "subdivision" to both platted and unplatted subdivisions, would strengthen the proposition that planning commissions
presently have authority to control directly the subdividing of land, and,
in the case of the amendment, would remove any ambiguity as to the
commission's authority.
Another method of decreasing the problem of land sale by metes and
bounds under present statutes would be to make platting a more attractive
prospect than it is presently. To offset the burdens which subdivision
control requirements may impose upon the subdivider, the commission
84. Ind. Acts 1935, ch. 268, § 9.
85. IN . ANN. STAT. §§ 53-701 to -795 (Burns 1964).
86. Reps, supra note 28, at 279 (citing no authority).
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may approve plats of subdivisions in which improvements have not yet
been made, if, pursuant to 53-751,87 the applicant provides a bond. As a
practical matter, this makes platting more appealing to the subdivider
by delaying certain financial burdens, since by virtue of the bond the
subdivider can gain commission approval before required improvements
are made and can commence selling the lots and make the improvements
as he sells the lots and is better able financially to do so.
A frequent reason given for not platting the subdivision is the
increase in real estate tax as a result of platting. As the ability to post a
bond makes platting more appealing by delaying certain expenses to
the subdivider, so might a reworking of the tax assessment standard. One
approach to assessment revision would be statutory prohibition of any
increase in the assessed tax valuation of property resulting from platting for a period of "X" years. This would mean that when a plat
is recorded the assessment of the land, usually assessed as "acreage,"
would only increase in assessment as the subdivider constructed improvements on it, rather than be assessed as a residential site immediately upon
plat recordation. A second solution might be found in an informal assessment arrangement. The assessment supervisor could instruct the assessors
that, until a large number of the lots are sold, the assessment should be
increased only by the actual cost of improvements actually made (for
example, curbs and streets).
V.

CONCLUSION

A good subdivision control program benefits the public, future
residents, and the community as a whole. If the planning commission's
control can be avoided by subdividers' selling their lots by metes and
bounds, then the program's effectiveness is reduced to a nullity and the
community, present and future, suffers.
It is suggested that there are grounds in the present statute for
concluding that planning boards presently have the authority to control
unplatted as well as platted subdivisions of land and that planning commissions should not hesitate to assert control of all subdivision activity
for the betterment of their communities. There are few decisions to guide
resolution of the more controversial aspects of subdivision control, but in
the past decade the courts have taken a more sympathetic view of community planning. 8 The Supreme Court of Indiana" has indicated an
87. IND. ANN. STAT. § 53-751 (Burns 1964).
88. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), held that the condemnation of property
pursuant to the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945 was for a public purpose and consistent with due process of law and that the delegation of authority in the
act was qualified with sufficient standards. The court stated that the District of
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interest in the enactment of codes for municipal development and recognized the community's related responsibility in the matter. It is reasonable to conclude that the Indiana courts would follow the trend toward
recognizing more liberal methods of subdivision control and would be
favorably disposed toward statutory determinations and municipal enactments which broaden planning commission authority.
Indiana planning commissions should approach the exercise of subdivision control powers with an expectation of judicial acquiescence,
implementing any device or statutory construction which they think
reasonable to cope with the problems presently existing. As long as this
exercise is reasonable and is really necessary to the public welfare, the
commissions should experience little difficulty in defending and effectuating their controls.
Columbia's police power comprehends wide discretion in the acquisition and redevelopment of large blocks of land. The court indicated that the police power embraces redevelopment for the general objective of achieving a "well-balanced," more attractive
community. Id. at 33. The Supreme Court in this case seems to extend the police power
into new areas by use of this language. This case indicates that the constitution will
accommodate a wide range of community planning devices as the local governments seek
new ways to meet the problems of growth.
89. Knutson v. State ex rel. Seberzer, 239 Ind. 656, 669, 157 N.E.2d 469, 473 (1959).

